LAW AND THE SCIENCE OF LAW IN RECENT THEORIES by POUND, ROSCOE
YALE LAW JOURNAL
VOL. XLIII FEBRUARY, 1934 No. 4
LAW AND THE SCIENCE OF LAW IN
RECENT THEORIES*
ROSCOE POUNDt
"Rechtswissenschaft," says Kantorowicz, "ist Wortwissenschaft." Much
of the discussion as to the "nature of law" which raged in the last century,
and much which goes on today, seems to justify this gibe.
For many reasons, "law" does not admit of the sort of definition which
was attempted. In what is perhaps its oldest meaning in the modern
world it refers to the body of authoritative precepts by which tribunals
are to be guided in the determination of controversies, and hence those
by which individuals are to be guided in their conduct. But even this is a
composite. For one thing, some of the precepts are enacted and some are
traditional, and it matters much which are taken as the type.' For
another, the body of authoritative materials for the guidance of tribunals
includes more than precepts. A received traditional technique and a
number of received ideals are also to be considered; 2 and along with rules,
prescribing definite, detailed consequences for definite detailed states of
fact, there are principles, conceptions, and standards,3 and in another
direction doctrines and systematic ideas, and in another direction insti-
tutions, to be considered. Moreover, much depends on the standpoint
from which the body of precepts, if one limits himself to these, is ap-
*An abridged version of this paper was read before the Association of American Law
Schools, December 30, 1933.
tDean and Carter Professor of General Jurisprudence, Harvard Law School.
1. I discussed this matter at some length in a paper, Theories of Law (1912) 22 YA
L. J. 114.
2. I have discussed this in a number of papers: The Theory of Judicial Decision (1923)
36 H v. L. Rv. 641, 643-653; The Ideal Elemeni in American Judicial Decision (1931)
45 H v. L. REv. 136; A Comparison of Ideals of Law (1933) 47 HiARv. L. REv. 1.
3. This, too, I have considered at length elsewhere: Juristic Science and Law (1918)
31 HARv. L. REv. 1047, 1060 et seq.; The Administrative Application of Legal Standards
(1919) 44 A. B. A. REP. 445, 454-45S; Hierarchy of Sources and Forms in Different Systems
of Law (1933) 7 TuLANE L. REv. 475, 481-486.
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proached.4 From the standpoint of the judge we may think of rules of
decision. From the standpoint of the individual we may think of rules
of conduct or of threats of consequences of conduct. From the stand-
point of the counsellor at law they seem rather to be the basis of prophe-
sies or predictions of judicial and administrative action. From the stand-
point of the jurist, they might seem a body of raw materials for syste-
matic organization or for the development of doctrine.
But "law" has been used not only for the body of legal precepts or, in
a wider sense, for the whole body of authoritative materials in which are
to be found the grounds of judicial and administrative action, but also for
the legal order,5 and in addition, recently, for the judicial process.6
Analytical jurisprudence uses "law" in the first of these three senses. It
thinks of the rule element of law used in that sense. It thinks of rules of
law either as rules of conduct or as rules of decision. Historical and
philosophical jurists in the last century, however, by no means acquiesced
in this limitation of the meaning of "law"; and in recent times new mean-
ings have been attached to the term with the rise of new schools of jurists.
John Dewey has noted that in philosophy generally today we are so
"largely occupied with merely technical and formal questions that we
are threatened with a new kind of scholasticism that lacks the vitality of
classic scholasticism." 7 The revival of analytical jurisprudence since the
World War, the belated recognition of Austin on the Continent since
the second decade of the present century,' and the recent development of
analytical theories on bases of social-philosophical jurisprudence, suggest
a like tendency in the science of law.
Following Bentham,9 the English analytical jurists assumed that "law"
was an aggregate of "laws." It followed that by analyzing and defining
"a law" they could arrive at an understanding of "law." From that
standpoint "law" was a body of legal precepts and the task of a science
4. See my paper Hierarchy of Sources and Forms in Different Systems of Law, supro
note 3, at 479481.
5. KAxt, METAI'ysisc m AxFANGSG UNDE DER REcHTsLE= (1797) 27; KAUSE, ABPiss
DES SYSTEMES DER Pnx'OSOPIE DES RECHTES (1828) 209; GAREIS, ENZyxLOPXDIE DER
RECnHTSWlSSENSCE1APT (1887) § 5; 3 BEIoLzummr, SYSTEM DER RECHTS- UND WIRT1-
SCnArTSPHmOSOP= (1906) § 17.
6. E.g., FRANx, LAW AxD T= MODEan Ain (1930) 274n.
7. Review of Report of the President's Research Commission on Social Trends (1933)
43 INT. J. or ETHICS 339, 345.
8. Soa m6, JuasTISscn GRuNDLEmRE (1917); LfvY-ULLmANN, LA DframnoN DU DROIT
(1917); RoGumi, LA ScIENcE JuRIDIQUE PURE (1923); K.nsEN, DAS PROBLEM DER Sou-
VERANITAT (1920). See PoUND, The Progress of the Law-Analytical Jurisprudence, 1914-
1927 (1927) 41 HAxv. L. REV. 174.
9. PRINciPLES or MoRAas AND LEGISLATION (1879 ed.) 324.
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of law was to distinguish those precepts from others superficially analog-
ous. When they had done this and had excluded everything but legal
precepts or "laws" properly so-called, they felt that they had arrived at
the "pure fact of law," as they called it,'° that they had determined "the
province of jurisprudence,"", and that they were on a solid footing of
reality.' 2 The historical jurists, starting with primitive where the ana-
lytical jurists started with developed systems, could find there no differ-
entiated social control. Law in the sense of a body of laws, morals, ethical
custom, customary courses of decision, customary modes of conducting
transactions, and even religious xites were found making up an undiffer-
entiated body of precepts of social control. So they assumed that all
social control was "law."' 3 They thought of the legal order, one phase
or side of social control, as the immediate province of jurisprudence, and
concerned themselves with the basis of the authority, the nature of the
sanctions and the mode of evolution of the legal order in the societies of
western Europe and of its characteristic institutions. How completely
analytical jurist and historical jurist were talking of different things while
discussing the nature of "law," thought of as one thing, is brought out
when we compare Austin's theory of sanction 4 with Maine's' 5 Austin
is talking of that which makes particular legal precepts effective in action.
Maine is talking about the basis of the effectiveness of the legal order as a
whole. Yet each speaks of the sanction of "law."
Philosophical jurists likewise took part in the discussion. What in-
terested them was neither the aggregate of "laws" nor a specialized regime
of social control. They were looking at and talking about a body of
received ideals of what social control was for, of the end of social and
legal institutions, and of what legal precepts should be in the light there-
of.' These ideals seemed to them enduring realities of which legal pre-
cepts or regimes of social control or legal orders of the time and place
were but imperfect realizations or fumbling formulations. They were
talking of a very real thing when they discussed such ideals. But they
labeled this real thing "law," as the analytical jurists had labeled the
aggregate of legal precepts "law," and as the historical jurists had affixed
the same label to all social control. Laws were made or established by
10. Amos, SYSTEMATIC VIEW OF THE SCIENCE OF JURispRuDENCE (1872) 18.
11. 1 AusTN, J [xIsPauDENsCE (3d ed. 1869) 82.
12. MAniau, ELEMENTS Or LAW (4th ed. 1889) § 12.
13. 1 Vi OGRADorI, HISTORICAL JURISPRUDENCE (1920) 119.
14. 1 AusTIn, op. cit. supra note 11, at 94.
15. IANE, INTERNATIONAL LAW (1888) 50-52.
16. E.g., "The expression of the idea of right involved in the relation of two or more
human beings." MImLER, PnmosoPny OF LAW (1884) 9.
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determinate lawmakers. Social control developed; it was not made to
order at one stroke. The ideal element in the body of laws, the received
ideals which give direction to social control, were not made, they were
discovered. The controversy whether "law" was made, or grew, or was
discovered came to little more than a question of which of three things
was entitled to the label "law." There were at least three things. There
was but one label.
With the rise of psychology in the present century, another thing has
claimed attention and those who have their eyes upon it have been striving
to claim for it the same label. As what Mr. Justice Cardozo has happily
called the judicial process, to which we must soon be adding what might
be called the administrative process, comes to be studied, those who have
come to be aware of its significance and of the problems which it raises
soon claim for it the label "law." They argue that everything that enters
into or affects the judicial process is "law," or that the whole process,
both judicial and administrative-everything "which officials do" about
disputes,--is "law" and that every factor which affects what such officials
do must be taken account of in a theory of law. 7
It would seem, therefore, that what is needed is more labels, not more
discussion as to title to the older one. But in truth we have labels enough.
We can speak of the body or system of laws, of the legal order, of the
body of received ideals, and of the judicial process. And if we could
induce the participants to adopt these labels, the controversy would still
go on. For behind the attempts to appropriate the term "law" for some
one of four distinct things, is a controversy as to the relative significance
of the several things and as to the province and scope of jurisprudence.
How far does each or do all of these things come within the province of
the jurist? If his province is said to be the science of "law," then the
advocates of each of the four will claim for it the name of "law" and will
vouch for their claims arguments as to the "nature of law." When we
show that the term "law" is used in more than one sense we have not
shown that the discussions as to the nature of "law" are futile. We have
only shown that they have in form been misdirected.
Perhaps some consciousness of this is reflected in the boast of every
type of jurist that he is dealing with reality while those who would apply
the label "law" in a different way are dealing with illusion. We have
seen that the analytical jurist saw in the positive legal precepts of each
particular jurisdiction the "pure fact of law." The historical jurist saw
in legislative imperatives mere illusion. There was no life except in the
17. FRANK, loc. cit. suPra note 6; LLEwELLYN, Tn3 BRAmIBLE BUSH (1930) 3.
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principles of human or of social action revealed by experience and formu-
lated in a continuous historical development. The philosophical jurist
thought of legislation and empirical formulations alike "as crude gropings
for ideals which alone had significance. The positivist told us that he
alone had grasped reality by means of observation verified by further
observation. The economic realist asserted that precepts and principles
and ideals and positivist observations through the spectacles of jurists
and lawyers were equally illusory and that reality was to be found in the
self-interest of the dominant social class of the time and place, imposing
its will upon those who are weaker by a skillful camouflage of rules and
principles and ideals and positivist observations.' 8 When the realist of
the moment tells us that he is a realist because he has found reality in
the emotive experience or psychological make-up of particular judges or
officials for the time being, he is but conforming to the settled tradition of
jurisprudence for the past two centuries.
What we need to see in all this controversy, is that each group has its
eye on something significant-more significant it may be at some times
and in some places than others, but of enduring significance for the busi-
ness of the jurist. Legal precepts have demonstrated their significance
through experience of administration of justice by means of them in all
lands and in all ages. When organized bodies of legal precepts, such as
the modern Roman law, are found going round the world and guiding
tribunals in the most diverse countries and among the most diverse races
and holding their ground for centuries, there can be no touch with
reality in a realism which denies their significance. Yet one need not,
because he concedes their significance, confine the province of juris-
prudence to systematizing and harmonizing them. The legal order is no
less significant, and its historical continuity has been vindicated over
and again against attempts at creative lawmaking out of whole cloth. A
body of received ideals of the legal order, and of the ends of social control
and of what legal precepts and their application should be, is one of the
decisive factors not only in lawmaking and in juristic thinking, but in the
process of judicial decision and administrative determination. The posi-
tivists had their finger on something of no mean significance when they
insisted on the relation of legal to social phenomena as one phase of the
latter to which, therefore, their science of society was applicable. The
economic realists, if they carried it too far, none the less pointed out a
factor of much influence in shaping and giving content to the imperative
element in a body of legal precepts. And the psychological realists, as
one might style them for the purposes of the moment, call our attention
18. Brooks Adams in CETRALMZATION AND THE LAW (1906) 23, 31-35, 63-64, 132-133.
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to factors in the judicial and administrative processes to which we must
not close our eyes, which it behooves us to study in their operation and
effect, and which; I suppose, even the most rigorous analytical jurist did
not deny but merely relegated to the field of politics.
We need to see also how these different limitations of the province of
jurisprudence and affixings of the label "law" to this or that depend on
the social, political and legal problems of times and places and result
from putting universally what are usually good working hypotheses for
those times and places. English analytical jurisprudence puts universally
the working formulas of the legislative reform movement of the nine-
teenth century. German historical jurisprudence puts universally the
working creed of the reaction from the paper constitution-making and
rationalist lawmaking of the French Revolution. Nineteenth-century
metaphysical jurisprudence formulated universally the ideals of the era
of competitive acquisitive self-assertion on the part of economically self-
sufficient units in western Europe and America of that time. Positivism
sought to formulate universally the rising demands of what may be called
the socialization of law, using law in all three senses. The economic
realists formulated universally interpretations of the transition from the
competitive economic order to some order we have yet to understand
and christen. The American realists of the moment, as I venture to
think, put universally a theory of the judicial process as it goes on in
the United States today, in a time of transition, when ideals are in flux
and there is little to guide the application of standards, while there is a
constantly increasing number of standards to apply.
All of these things, I have long contended, are within the province of
jurisprudence. We need not call them all "law." Indeed, to do so invites
confusion with no compensating advantages. The organized body of
knowledge which has to do with a specialized phase or part of social
control, namely, that part or phase which is carried on by politically
organized society through the systematic application of the force of its
organization to secure interests or desires or demands of human beings,
is not to be limited by definitions of any traditional monosyllable.
In contemporary juristic thought, if we look the world over, the signifi-
cant names are those of Jhering, Stammler, G6ny, Duguit and Kelsen.
Jhering19 turned our attention from the nature of law (meaning by "law"
in this connection the legal order) to its end or purpose. He attacked
the prevailing jurisprudence of conceptions and called for a jurisprudence
of realities. Legal doctrines and legal conceptions, he said, were to grow
out of life, instead of forcing life into legal doctrines and conceptions.
19. DER ZWEcK m RECa (1877-1883); SCHEEZ UND ERNST IN DER JURISPRUDENZ (1884).
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Thus he turned attention also to the administrative element, the element
of adjustment to unique situations, in the application of legal precepts
to life or as we should say in America today, in the judicial process.
Jhering died in 1892, and his last significant work was done in 1884.
But his influence on jurisprudence has grown continually in the present
century. Social utilitarians, positivists, and realists draw upon him
continually. Indeed, juristic skepticism has brought forth little that
cannot be found well put in his pages. Since Jhering, every jurist has
been more or less a realist in the American sense 20
Stammler 21 has had the widest following on the Continent and- now
claims the greatest number of disciples of any jurist of the time. To my
mind, his enduring contributions are in the legal rather than the philo-
sophical parts of his writings. If his Kantian philosophy does not appeal
to the present generation in the English-speaking world, his insistence on
the relation of morals and ethics to the administration of justice through
legal precepts, his theory of the social ideal as the criterion of justice
through precepts, his insistence on the just decision of causes instead of
merely on just rules, and his qu4est for a measure of values as a basis for
application of legal precepts, bear upon the crucial problems of juris-
prudence today and will require jurists to go back to him as we have
been going back to Jhering.22
G6ny,23 too, has been busied with the fundamental problem of values.
But what is more important for us here and now, he has called our at-
tention to the technique element in law (using law in the sense of the
authoritative materials of judicial and administrative determination) and
to the non-mechanical and administrative element in application of legal
precepts and in adjudication, and has sought to put it in the order of
reason.
Duguit 4 likewise worked on the problem of values, but his significant
20. Note the influence of Jhering in BENTLEY, TBE PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT (1908).
21. WmTuscT . uND RE= (1896); LE:mE vON DEm RIcHTiGEN RECHTE (1902, new
ed. 1926); THErom DER RECHTSwISSENSCHArT (1911); LEHEBuCH DER REcHTSPHrLOSOPHIE
(1922, 2d ed. 1923). There is a very good discussion of Stammler by Ginsburg in MODERN
THEORms OF LAW (1933) 38-51. See also BnwDER, PH:rosoPmE DES REaCHS (1925).
22. The school of Neo-Hegelians, followers of Josef Kohler, which was very active in
the first two decades of this century, seems to have no important representatives at present.
But I suspect that presently Kohler will be reckoned as one of the outstanding juristic
thinkers of the century.
23. MATHODE D'INTERPRETATION Ex DRorr PRIV Posnr (1899, 2d ed. 1919); 1 SCIENCE
ET TECHEwIQUE EN DRorr Paiv9 PosrrF (1913); 2 id. (1915); 3 id. (1921); 4 id. (1924).
There is a good discussion of G~ny by Wortley, in MODERN T EORIES OF LAw (1933)
139-159.
24. L'TAT, LE DROrI OBJECTIT, xT IA Loi PosmTIF (1901); LE DROIT SOCIAL, LE DROTI
INDIVIDUEL ET LA TRANSFORMATION DE L'TAT (2d ed. 1911); LES TRANSFORMTIONS
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contribution has been to further the conception of the legal order as a
part and phase of social control and the bringing to bear upon legal
problems of the whole apparatus of the social sciences.
Kelsen 5 now that Stammler has retired, is unquestionably the leading
jurist of the time. His disciples are devoted and full of enthusiasm in
every land. His ideas are discussed in all languages. His followers are
probably the most active group in contemporary jurisprudence. In
philosophy of law he is a Neo-Kantian and builds on Stammler.20 But
the critical side of his work is not of so much interest for us as the
analytical. Three of his ideas are having wide influence: (1) The idea
of jurisprudence as a normative science, 7 that is, one having to do with
what ought to be in contrast with the natural sciences which have to do
with what is, and hence depend upon observation and experiment; (2) the
idea of a body of laws resting upon some ultimate and legally unchallenge-
able norm in most modern states a written constitution, which takes
the place, in his theory, of Austin's sovereign; and (3) the idea of the
unity of the legal order.
As to the first, it will be seen that he thus answers much of what has
been written of late as to how far there is or may be a science of law.
His answer is that of St. Thomas Aquinas-distinguo. Analytical juris-
G N sALE DU DROIT PiRvE (1912) ; Law and the State (trans]. by DeSloov~re) (1917) 31
HAgv. L. REV. 1-185. More attention has been paid to Duguit's political than to his juristic
theory.
25. HAUPTPROBLEME DER STAATSRECiHTSLEHRE (1911); DAS PROBLEM DER SOUVERKNITXT
UND DIE THEORIE DES V6LKERRECHTS (1920, 2d ed. 1928); DER SOZIOLOGISCHE UND JURIS-
TISCHE STAATSBEGRIF (1st ed. 1922, 2d ed. 1928) ; ALLGEMEINE STAATSLEHE (1925). There
is an excellent exposition and discussion of Kelsen by Lauterpacht, in MODERN THEORIES Or
LAw (1933) 105-138. See also Voegelin, Kelsen's Pure Theory of Law (1927) 42 POL. Sci.
Q. 268.
26. From the standpoint of philosophy of law, Kelsen's doctrine might be termed norma-
tive logicism. He seeks by formal logic to find conceptions which are to yield pure norms.
Stammler's might be called an a-priorist logicism. He seeks generally valid presuppositions
by a universal logical method. As to the philosophical side of Kelsen's work, in addition to
his writings above referred to, see SANDER, STAAT UND RECHT (1922) ; RECHTSDOGUATIK ODrR
THEORIE DER RECHTSEPFYHMUNG (1921); KELsEN's RECHTSLEHRE (1923); DIE TRANszE=-
DENTALE METEODE DER REcHiTSPHILOSOPE UND DER BEGRIFr DES RECHTSVERFA RENS (1920);
PROLEGOMENA ZU EINER THEORIE DER RECHTSERFAHRUNG (1922); ZuR METHODII DER
RECTSWiSSENSCHAPr (1923).
27. This theory of law as made up not of rules of what must be but of authoritative
patterns of what ought to be-of what decisions ought to be and of what conduct ought to
be-serves well to reconcile the results of looking at laws from different standpoints. The
norms may be looked on as guides to conduct, as guides to decision, as threats of legal con-
sequences, or as grounds of prediction of official action. As authoritative patterns, they can
function in any of these ways. The norm theory begins with 1 BINDIG, DE NoRa N UND
m UEBERTRETUNG, (1872, 2d ed. 1890).
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prudence eliminated all consideration of what ought to be and set up
a "formal science"28 on the basis of a postulated "pure fact of law."
Recent realists have urged that as the phenomena of the judicial process
do not always or necessarily conform to the rules of law, in which the
analytical jurists found the materials on which to work with their formal
science, it follows that there is no science of law, nor can there be one
until a new set of materials is subjected to a new type of procedure. But
what legal precepts ought to be, what decisions ought to be, what the
judicial process in its details ought to be, are questions that have never
wholly disappeared from our books, and have proved to be inseparably
bound up in the question of what is, in which positivists and more recently
realists have been seeking the basis of a real science. Here, again, the
dispute is largely about words.
As a result of the second idea, Kelsen holds that we need not seek to
bring law into accord with life. The norms are not to grow out of life,
but life is to be adjusted to the norms. Compare Krause's formula which
puts as the end of law the "life measured by reason." There is much in
this in one sense. But in truth he and Jhering are talking of different
things.
In the third he is explaining, in a way contrasting with treatment of
the same problem from the standpoint of natural law, a matter much
discussed in the Continental books.
In the judicial process the judge may at times and often does go out-
side of the body of authoritative legal materials for the guidance of
decision. For example, the Austrian Civil Code provides that if the code
leaves a question of law doubtful, "it must be decided in accordance with
natural principles of right and law." The Italian Civil Code has a like
provision. The Swiss Civil Code provides that in such cases the judge
is to "pronounce in accordance with the rules which he would establish
if he were to legislate." A similar situation in. our law, where a court,
for default of an applicable rule, turns to some precept of morals and
applies it, has been discussed by analytical jurists since Austin. They
had been in the habit of saying (using law in the sense of an aggregate
of laws) that the first decision here was without law but under our
Anglo-American doctrine of precedent might establish a law. Kelsen,
using law in the sense of the legal order, says that it is within the law
where the judge, as in case of the code provisions above, is referred by
a law to the materials which he uses or is commanded to resort to them.
In other words, the extra-legal materials, in the English analytical sense,
may yet be made part of the law or brought into the law (in the sense
28. HoLLAND, EmEMENTS or JuRXPRIuDENcE (1880) 11, (13th ed. 1924) 13. See JENKxs,
Tzm NEw JuRiSPRnmDEm= (1933) 138-141.
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of the legal order) by reference. This would serve also to fit permissible
or prescribed discretion and a prescribed or permitted administrative
element into the analytical theory.
So far as it shows that such things may be a proper and normal part
of the legal order, that is, that all the operations of the judicial process
do not need to take place in accordance with the exact prescribings of
texts of a body of laws in order to be normal features of a legal order,
Kelsen's point is well taken. But suppose instead of finding the basis
of his decision in the materials to which the rule in the code refers
him, an Austrian judge ignores the provision and shakes dice or gives
effect to his personal prejudice against one of the parties? Here we
have an operation of the judicial process. If such things happen at all
frequently, the jurist must look into them and ask how and why they
take place. But unless we use "law" in a new sense to cover all the
operations of judges, without regard to the materials prescribed for their
guidance, we can hardly say they take place according to law, much less
that they are law. Nor would Kelsen go so far. What he insists on is
that the utilizing of materials outside of the codes, to which the judge
is referred by a rule of law, is not an extra-legal process.
Looking back at the work of these five significant jurists, do we find
anything in common? For one thing, they all put the problem of values,
of a criterion for valuing interests or claims or desires, in the first place
as the fundamental problem of jurisprudence. Secondly, they look at
the legal order and the body of legal precepts and the judicial process
functionally. They ask how these work toward the ends disclosed by
their measure of values. This leads them to appreciate the administrative
element in the judicial process, to make provision in their theories for an
individualized application of legal precepts, and to take account of the
need of just and reasonable solutions of concrete cases, where the juristic
thought of the past asked only if the rules applied were in themselves,
and abstractly, reasonable and just. Thirdly, in one way or another,
they think of law in relation to the whole process of social control.
Finally, they think of "law" as something much more complex than was
dreamed of in the last century and of the province of jurisprudence as
much more inclusive.
Reviewing the juristic thought of the nineteenth century, we see that
from the most diverse starting points and with the most diverse methods,
jurists came to substantially the same result on the crucial problems of
the legal order and the judicial process. Today, also, as we look at the
different types of social-philosophical and sociological jurists we see
a general movement in all of them in the same direction. In increasing
measure we may perceive the same objectives and the same approach to
them in all parts of the world.
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In the United States we are more concerned with the judicial process
than are jurists elsewhere, and that concern makes our juristic left wing
seem more radical than the juristic left wing elsewhere. Professor
Goodhart of Oxford in a recent book of lectures by British jurists on
contemporary theories of law has psychoanalyzed the American realists,
and has suggested a psychological explanation of their doctrines. 9 But
it seems to me more worth while to note how their emphasis on certain
phenomena of the judicial process is connected with contemporary
features of the legal order in the United States.
We must remember that certain problems of the judicial process which
seem practically negligible elsewhere, have become acute with us. We
have no unified source of lawmaking, either legislative or judicial. In
any particular jurisdiction the great mass of our output of judicial de-
cision has only persuasive authority. Forty-nine lawmaking bodies and
sixty high appellate tribunals have power to declare the law by estab-
lishing precedents binding within their jurisdiction and persuasive with-
out. From the first it has been part of our judicial tradition, and it was
once a necessary part, to try every legal precept, at the crisis of applica-
tion, with respect to its applicability, that is, its measuring up to judicial
ideals. This unstable tendency has been aggravated by short tenure of
judicial office and subjection of judges to politics in a majority of the
states. It has been aggravated by the growth of inadequately trained
bars in our great cities-by the filling up of the profession with prac-
titioners who can only conceive of law as a body of rules of thumb. In
a time when the emphasis is upon change this unstable tendency is mani-
fest under great diversity of conditions in different jurisdictions. The
several states are in different degrees of transition from pioneer or rural
agricultural conditions. In our great cities there is a large unsettled
population, and the turnover of population everywhere is relatively large.
Moreover, our polity requires standards of reasonableness to be en-
forced judicially upon legislation under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments. All this throws an exceptionally heavy burden on the American
judiciary and makes us, for the time being, exaggerate the place of the
judicial process in a general science of law.
In many ways the present state of the legal order throughout the
world suggests the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. There is the
same groping for new ideas and ideals. There is the same failure of
authority with nothing as yet discovered to take its place. There is the
same resort to personal justice, administrative tribunals, and sometimes
crude individualized methods. There is the same chafing, on the one
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hand, at rule and form and, on the other hand, at a loose and unlimited
judicial process.
As the strict law gave us rule and form as a means to certainty and
uniformity in the granting and applying of legal remedies, as equity and
natural law gave us the idea of making conduct certain by insistence on
reason and good faith, the nineteenth century gave us the system of
individual legal rights as a means toward security, an end toward which
the other means had been reaching. Thus each stage in the development
of the modern legal order has left some permanent contribution, to which
we have added others without losing them. What the stage on which
we seem to have entered will bring forth, it would be useless to con-
jecture. But we need not doubt that it will build on these achievements
of the past.
